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
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THE DUAL ALLIANCE  
—VS.—  
THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

# GERMANY'S CASE —IN THE— SUPREME COURT OF CIVILIZATION

DR. KARL HELFFERICH, GERMAN  
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY,  
REVIEWS THE "WHITE," "YELLOW,"  
AND "ORANGE" PAPERS, AND  
REACHES A DIFFERENT CONCLU-  
SION FROM THAT OF JAMES M.  
BECK, HOLDING THE ALLIES  
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WAR



THE FATHERLAND CORPORATION  
1123 BROADWAY  
NEW YORK



The Dual Alliance

*vs.*

The Triple Entente

# Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization

Dr. Karl Helfferich, German Secretary of the Treasury,  
Reviews the "White," "Yellow," and "Orange" Papers,  
and Reaches a Different Conclusion from that  
of James M. Beck, Holding the Allies  
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Dr. Helfferich's brilliant analysis of the world situation was published first by George Stilke, Berlin, under the title of "The Genesis of the Great War." It appeared in the *N. Y. Times* under the title under which it is here reprinted.

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THE GENESIS OF THE GREAT WAR

The following is a translation from the semi-official *Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of Jan. 26 of an exhaustive comparative study by Dr. Karl Helfferich of the diplomatic documents published by the various warring countries concerning the origin of the world war. Dr. Helfferich, whose accession to the office of Imperial Secretary of the Treasury was hailed with satisfaction throughout Germany on Jan. 16, was then only 43 years old, but was considered the leading financial authority in Germany. At that time the German newspapers pointed out that Dr. Helfferich's appointment spelled the end of the bureaucratic system theretofore regnant in the Treasury Department, and was auspicious for the efficient and thorough-going management of the office in the enormous work that would be thrust upon it when terms of peace and final international settlements would be made.

Dr. Helfferich at the time of his appointment to the Secretaryship of the Treasury was Director of the Deutsche Bank and Wirklicher Legationsrat, (Actual Councillor of Legation,) with the title of Professor. It was he who introduced the recent Reichstag budget for 1915 in the Federal Council and Reichstag.



# GERMANY'S CASE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CIVILIZATION

By Dr. Karl Helfferich.

THE Governments of England, Russia, and France thought, through the publication of the exchange of diplomatic writings of the days before the beginning of the world war, they could furnish a proof in the eyes of their own peoples and of the entire civilized world that the blame for the most gigantic shedding of blood which the world has ever experienced falls only upon "war-lusting Germany," and that they for their part did all in their power to avoid the catastrophe. England has published a "Blue Book," Russia an "Orange Book," and France a "Yellow Book." A series of indications argue that these publications, which profess an appearance of completeness, show important gaps, and particularly in the case of the French "Yellow Book" the proof can be regarded as furnished that certain documents there republished were belatedly fabricated. [Note 1.] Nevertheless the publications deserve a careful comparative study.

No attempt will be made here to follow in all their details the extraordinarily tangled diplomatic windings and cross-windings that

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[Note 1.—Thus the "Yellow Book," in its first chapter, entitled "Avertissements," contains a series of documents which, beginning from March, 1913, are intended to prove a growing war sentiment in Germany. Among them, designated as No. 5, dated July 30, 1913, is a note of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which is said:

"M. von Kiderlen fut l'homme le plus haï de l'Allemagne, l'hiver dernier. Cependant il commence à n'être plus que déconsidéré, car il laisse entendre qu'il prendra sa revanche." ("Herr von Kiderlen was last Winter the best-hated man in Germany. At present he is beginning to be only disliked (instead of hated,) for he allows it to be understood that he will take his revenge (for Morocco.'")

Secretary of State von Kiderlen, who, according to this, began to meditate vengeance in July, 1913, had already died in December, 1912, a fact which was manifestly not realized by that official of the Quai d'Orsay who belatedly fabricated this "Yellow Book" document.

A similar misfortune happened in the case of a note which, according to the English "Blue Book," M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador to London, ostensibly handed on July 30, 1914, to the English Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the contents of which deal with the German

preceded the beginning of the war. Rather, it is here pertinent only to present to the world merely the most important happenings that brought on the war, by means of the evidence offered by the Triple Entente powers themselves.

For this purpose, only those steps will next be ascertained which directly caused the outbreak of the war. Pursued from this point the threads will be followed backward and untangled as far as possible.

#### **The Firebrands.**

There can be no doubt about the direct cause of the war. The cause was the general mobilization of the Russian fighting forces on land and sea ordered by the Czar early on the morning of July 31, and the refusal of Russia to rescind this measure as demanded by Germany.

It is important to establish right here the fact that the Russian Government was fully clear in its knowledge that the ordering of general mobilization and the maintenance of this step must make war with Germany inevitable. In official and unofficial ways it was made clear with all emphasis to the Russian Government in good time that a Russian mobilization meant the same as a German mobilization and a German mobilization meant the same as war. [Note 2.]

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military preparations on the Alsace-Lorraine border ("Blue Book," No. 105, Annex 3.) Through the dating of this note on July 30, the impression was to be created that at that time, and even in the days preceding, the German troops had already stood close to the border and had even crossed the border through patrols. The note begins, in the wording of the third edition of the "Blue Book:" "L'armée allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes-frontières, hier par deux fois des patrouilles allemandes ont pénétré sur notre territoire" ("the German Army has its advance posts on our border; yesterday the German patrols twice penetrated upon our territory.")

"Yesterday," in a note transmitted on July 30, naturally means July 29. The 29th of July was a Wednesday. In the first edition of the "Blue Book," however, it read "hier, vendredi" ("yesterday, Friday"); the "vendredi" was stricken out only afterward, when the inconsistency was noticed. From this it appears that the note ostensibly transmitted on July 30 could at all events have been framed only on Sunday, Aug. 1, quite aside from the fact that no trespass across the border took place either on July 29 or July 30.]

[Note 2.—According to the German "White Book" the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg was instructed on July 26 to hand to the Russian Government a declaration in which it was said:

"Preparatory military measures on the part of Russia will compel us to take similar measures, which must consist in the mobilization of the army. But mobilization means war."]

• The reasons are patent and decisive. Germany, in view of the danger of a war on several fronts, could not possibly forego the advantage of time which was assured for it by the more speedy mobilization of its own forces, as soon as the situation shaped itself to a general Russian mobilization. For this compelling reason of self-maintenance, Germany could not for a moment entertain the question of a mutual mobilization and then a state of expectant facing of one another.

As a proof that this view of the case was also admitted by the allies of Russia as quite self-evident, attention should be called to the report of the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Sir G. Buchanan, on July 25 ("Blue Book," No. 17) Buchanan reports about an interview with the Russian Foreign Minister, M. Sazonof:

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilized, Germany would not be content with mere mobilization, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once.

Even at the last hour the German Kaiser in person, in his telegram of July 30 at 1 o'clock in the afternoon, called the Czar's attention to the "dangers and heavy consequences of a mobilization."

The Russian Government and the Czar, therefore, in the order of general mobilization that followed on July 31, must have been quite clear in their minds that this order meant war.

If hereby the direct cause of the outbreak of the war is established, there arises the question through what reasons the general Russian mobilization was occasioned.

We owe it to those who are responsible for the decisive steps to examine next the reasons which they themselves allege.

Let us first listen to the Czar.

In his telegram to the German Kaiser, of July 30, at 1:20 o'clock in the afternoon, there is no suggestion of an impending general mobilization, but only a reference to the steps that had been taken against Austria-Hungary:

The military measures now going into force were already decided upon five days ago, and that for reasons of defense against the preparations of Austria-Hungary.

This telegram crossed in transit the telegram of the Kaiser mentioned above, which called attention to the heavy conse-

quences of a Russian mobilization and which moreover expressed the fear that even a mobilization directed exclusively against Austria-Hungary would endanger, if it would not make impossible, the rôle of mediator which the Kaiser had undertaken at the request of the Czar. The Czar replied on July 31, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, at an hour in which the order of general mobilization of the entire Russian fighting forces had already been issued:

It is impossible, for technical reasons, to stop our military preparations which have been made necessary by the mobilization of Austria-Hungary.

Either through the expression "our military preparations" there is meant only the partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary; in which case the Czar in this telegram ignores the already completed general mobilization directed against Germany, which to be sure, would be the simplest method of saving all efforts to find a justification; or, on the other hand, "our military preparations" means the general mobilization; in which case the Czar was able to allege only the military measures of Austria-Hungary as justification for this decisive step.

Now let us listen to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Concerning the reasons alleged by the latter, the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 31 reported to his Government:

En raison de la mobilisation générale de l'Autriche et des mesures de mobilisation prises secrètement, mais d'une manière continue, par l'Allemagne depuis six jours, l'ordre de la mobilisation générale russe a été donné. (For the reason of the general mobilization of Austria and measures of mobilization taken secretly but in a continuous manner by Germany for six days, the order of general Russian mobilization has been given.) ("Yellow Book," No. 118.)

On the same day the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg reports to Sir Edward Grey ("Blue Book," No. 113) that the general mobilization was ordered in consequence of a report of the Russian Ambassador at Vienna that Austria-Hungary was determined not to tolerate an intervention of the powers and that it was setting its troops into motion not only against Serbia, but also against Russia. There is added:

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.

In the Russian "Orange Book" itself one will seek in vain for the reason for the general mobilization. The communications concerning this decisive step, which without doubt were made to the Russian Ambassadors abroad, are not repeated, and the reader learns about the fact of the Russian mobilization against Germany only through the circular telegram in which Sazonof informs the chiefs of the Russian legations about the demand of Germany for the rescinding of the mobilization.

What, now, are the reasons for the general Russian mobilization that are given in the English and French Ambassadors' reports and the telegram of the Czar to the German Kaiser?

#### **Russian Mobilization.**

1.—THE GENERAL RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION AS A REPLY TO THE MILITARY MEASURES OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.—In order to provide protection against the alleged military preparations of Austria-Hungary against Russia, thirteen army corps had already been mobilized by Russia on July 29, (report of the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 29, "Yellow Book," No. 100.) The mobilization in the districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan was announced through the Russian Ambassador in Berlin to the German Government, with the justification that this measure was the reply to the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war against Serbia, which had taken place on the day before, and to the "mesures de mobilisation déjà appliquées à la plus grande partie de l'armée austro-hongroise." ("Yellow Book," No. 95.) As a matter of fact, Austria-Hungary, until the time of the general Russian mobilization, had mobilized only eight army corps. Contrary to the assertion of the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg of July 31, ("Yellow Book," No. 118,) (see Note 3,) a general mobilization in Austria-Hungary had not yet been ordered at the moment of the Russian general mobilization. Such an order, indeed, followed more as an answer to the Russian general mobilization in the course of July 31. The mobilization of thirteen army corps

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[Note 3.—This false assertion, which was never maintained by the Russian side itself, of the general Austrian mobilization that was said for its part to have induced Russia to make a general mobilization, reappears at various points in the French "Yellow Book"; thus, in the circular note of Viviani of Aug. 1 (No. 127) "l'Autriche a la première, procédé à une mobilization générale" ("Austria was the first to proceed to a general mobilization.")]

ordered by Russia on July 29 was, as a counter-measure to the mobilization of eight Austro-Hungarian army corps, in itself excessive and challenging. Nothing had happened on the part of the Danube Monarchy after July 29 that could have offered Russia occasion to proceed from the very extensive partial mobilization to the general mobilization which made the war inevitable.

2.—THE ALLEGED MILITARY PREPARATIONS OF GERMANY AGAINST RUSSIA.—The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in that critical time repeatedly saw and spoke to the German Ambassador each day. If the Russian Government thought it had knowledge of measures of mobilization which Germany was alleged to have made as long as six days before, that is to say, since July 25 ("Yellow Book," No. 118,) then nothing would have been more natural than for M. Sazonof to ask Count Pourtalès for explanation concerning this alleged mobilization, or to have called his attention to the fact that such measures could not remain without counter-measures on the part of Russia. An indication by Sazonof concerning these alleged German preparations would have been given all the more because Count Pourtalès in those days repeatedly called attention to the dangers of the Russian military preparations. So, on July 29, with the result that Sazonof confined himself to replying thereto :

Que les préparatifs russes sont motivés: d'une côté par l'intransigence obstinée de l'Autriche d'autre part, par le fait que huit corps austro-hongrois, sont déjà mobilisés (that the Russian preparations are motivated on the one hand by the obstinate intransigence of Austria, and on the other by the fact that eight Austro-Hungarian corps are already mobilized.) ("Yellow Book," No. 100.)

On July 30 also Count Pourtalès reverted to the Russian preparations without Sazonof's feeling himself called upon to ask a question in turn about the alleged German measures of mobilization. ("Yellow Book," No. 103.) The Czar, too, in his telegram to the German Kaiser, at no time and no place mentions anything whatever about the German military measures, which, according to the presentation of the facts offered by his Government, furnished a reason for the Russian general mobilization.

#### **German Preparations.**

The falsity of the justification of the Russian general mobilization by means of the German measures is fully exposed by the

fact that the French "Yellow Book" confirms the fact (No. 102) that the Russian Chief of the General Staff on July 29 gave his word of honor to the German Military Attaché that the military measures of Russia were directed exclusively against Austria-Hungary and not against Germany also. If Russia believed it knew of military measures taken by Germany, would the Russian Chief of the General Staff then have had any occasion to give such a word of honor? And if information had belatedly been received by the Russian Government concerning threatening German military preparations—as M. Sazonof, to be sure, asserted to the French and English Ambassadors, but never to the German Ambassador—would not the Russian Chief of the General Staff then have had the most urgent occasion, because of the word of honor he had given, to speak to the German Military Attaché about the changed situation presented as a result of such information, and to do this, too, before the irremediable step of general Russian mobilization had been taken? Nothing of all this happened. Russia has justified its general mobilization only to third powers, by the alleged German measures; but to the German Kaiser, the German Ambassador, and the German Military Attaché, however, it never uttered a word of inquiry, much less of complaint against the alleged German preparations, but rather gave calming assurances constantly.

3.—THE REFUSAL OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY TO PERMIT AN INTERVENTION BY THE POWERS.—This attempt at justification, transmitted by the English Ambassador to London, is almost grotesque in its effect, in conjunction with the fact that a new proposal for mediation emanating from Sir Edward Grey had already been transmitted once by the German Government to the Austro-Hungarian Government on the preceding day, and that the reply of Austria-Hungary to this proposal had not yet been given; that, furthermore, on the afternoon of July 30, a conversation had taken place in Vienna between Count Berchtold and the Russian Ambassador, which the French Ambassador in Vienna at once telegraphed to Paris as an interview of great importance, ("Un entretien de haute importance,") and which, in his opinion, permitted the belief to be entertained that not every prospect of a localization of the conflict was lost, ("Permettait de croire que toute chance de localiser le conflit n'était pas perdue.") ("Yellow Book," No. 104.)

The proposal of mediation made by Sir Edward Grey on July

29 suggested: Austria-Hungary should undertake, after the occupation of Belgrade and the Serbian territory at the border, not to advance further, while the powers would try to bring it about that Serbia should give to Austria-Hungary a satisfaction adequate for that monarchy. The territory occupied by the Austro-Hungarian Army should be evacuated again after the satisfaction had been rendered. Sir Edward Grey conveyed this proposal on July 30 to the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and added:

I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, and if it can be obtained I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides. ("Blue Book," No. 103.)

This proposal was transmitted and recommended by Germany to the Austro-Hungarian Government; similarly by the English and French Ambassadors to the Russian Government ("Yellow Book," No. 112.) The proposal was not yet answered by Austria, and Russia, too, had not yet taken any attitude concerning it, when the general Russian mobilization ensued. The assertion that the Russian general mobilization had been made necessary because Austria-Hungary declined all intervention by the powers, ("Blue Book," No. 113,) is thus in strict contradiction to the state of affairs as pictured in the English and French documents.

Much more important than the fact that Russia played out the card of general mobilization, while an as yet undisposed of English proposal of mediation lay before its Government and that of Austria-Hungary, is the direct conversation which took place on the evening before the general Russian mobilization between the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, M. Schebeko, and Count Berchtold. Let it be recalled that after Sir Edward Grey's first proposal of conference had encountered difficulties, Sazonof himself had taken the initiative toward direct negotiations with Austria-Hungary and that this initiative had at first been rejected in Vienna. ("Blue Book," No. 74.) In the conversation of July 30 the difficulties in the way of the direct exchange of views were obviated. According to the cited report of the French Ambassador, ("Yellow Book," No. 104,) who was informed of it by the Russian Ambassador as was his English colleague immediately after the conversation, M. Schebeko and Count Berchtold examined the terrible difficulties that were present, with the equal good will to find solutions that

might be acceptable to both sides, (avec une égal bonne volonté d'y adapter des solutions reciproquement acceptables.) The Russian Ambassador declared that the military preparations of Russia had no other purpose than to safeguard against the Austro-Hungarian measures and to announce the intention and the right of the Czar to have a voice in the settlement of the Serbian question. Count Berchtold answered with the declaration that the Austro-Hungarian preparations in Galicia likewise emanated from no purpose of aggression whatsoever. On both sides it was agreed to labor toward the end that the measures should not be interpreted as hostile steps. The report of the French Ambassador then continues:

Pour le règlement du conflit Austro-Serbe il a été convenu que les pourparlers seraient repris à Petersbourg entre M. Sazonof et le Comte Szapary; s'ils ont été interrompus, c'est par la suite d'un malentendu, le Comte Berchtold croyant que le Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Russie réclamait pour son interlocuteur des pouvoirs qui lui permettraient de modifier les termes de l'ultimatum autrichien. Le Comte Szapary sera seulement autorisé à discuter quel accommodement serait compatible, avec la dignité et le prestige dont les deux Empires ont Edward Grey proposait de confier aux quatre Puissances non directement et reduite aux deux plus intéressées qu'aurait lieu l'examen que Sir Edward Grey proposait de confier aux quatre Puissances non directement intéressées. Sir M. de Bunsen, qui se trouvait chez moi, a aussitôt déclaré à M. Schebeko que le Foreign Office approuvera entièrement cette nouvelle procédure. (With regard to the settlement of the Austro-Serbian dispute, it was agreed that the pourparlers shall be resumed in St. Petersburg between M. Sazonof and Count Szapary. Their interruption was due to a misunderstanding, Count Berchtold believing that the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs demanded that his interlocutor should be given powers enabling him to modify the terms of the Austrian ultimatum. Count Szapary will only be authorized to discuss what arrangement would be compatible with the dignity and the prestige of the two empires, which are to both of them an object of equal care. For the moment, therefore, it will be in this direct form, confined to the two most interested parties, that the examination of the situation will take place, which Sir Edward Grey proposed should be undertaken by the four not directly interested powers. Sir M. de Bunsen, who was with me, at once told M. Schebeko that the Foreign Office would entirely approve of this new procedure.)

#### **The Kaiser's Telegram.**

On the following day the Russian Ambassador in Berlin received the communication that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg confirmed the declaration of Count Berchtold to M.

Schebeko, with the explanation that his Government was ready to discuss with the Russian Government the note to Serbia, even concerning its material content ("que son Gouvernement était prêt à discuter avec le Gouvernement russe la note à la Serbie, même quant au fond") ("Yellow Book," No. 21.)

The Austro-Hungarian Government had thus on July 30 taken a decisive step on the road of compliance, in resuming the direct negotiations with Russia, and thereby declared itself ready to enter upon a till then stubbornly declined discussion of the material contents of the note addressed to Serbia. The reason for this decisive compliance on the part of Austria-Hungary, which for the moment was bound to remove the acute character of the crisis, appears forthwith if one examines the German "White Book." On July 28 the German Kaiser had telegraphed to the Czar:

Remembering the cordial friendship which has long united us two with a firm bond, I am therefore exerting all my influence to induce Austria-Hungary to strive for an open and satisfying understanding with Russia.

And in the telegram to the Czar on July 29 the Kaiser said:

I believe that a direct understanding between your Government and Vienna is possible and desirable, an understanding which, as I have already telegraphed to you, my Government is laboring with all its power to further.

The Kaiser added, as may here be emphasized:

Naturally military measures on the part of Russia that could be interpreted by Austria-Hungary as a threat would hasten a misfortune which we both wish to avoid, and would also undermine my position as an intermediary which—as your appeal to my friendship and help—I readily assumed.

This sequence of facts is confirmed by a telegram of Sir Edward Grey to the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 31, (Blue Book No. 110,) according to which the German Ambassador in London communicated to Grey "as a result of suggestions by the German Government," that an expression of views had taken place in Vienna between Count Berchtold and M. Schebeko, and that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been instructed to get into communication with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to give the latter explanations concerning the

Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia and to discuss all the Austro-Hungarian-Russian relations concerning suggestions and questions. Sir Edward Grey added that he had taken cognizance of this resumption of direct conversations between Russia and Austria-Hungary with great satisfaction.

Contrary to the assertions of the French "Yellow Book" that Germany at no stage of the proceedings seriously counseled in Vienna toward a spirit of conciliation and mutual concessions, it is thus established firmly that upon the intercession of the German Kaiser the Austro-Hungarian Government on the afternoon of July 30, yielded to the Russian wish, till then consistently rejected, for a discussion of the note to Serbia. It is further shown by the French "Yellow Book" that the Russian Ambassador in Vienna attributed the greatest importance to the conciliatory declaration of Count Berchtold and immediately instructed his French and English colleagues about this declaration. It is further established through the French "Yellow Book" that the French Ambassador in Vienna based the hope of a localizing of the conflict upon the conciliatory stand of Count Berchtold, and that the English Ambassador, without first inquiring back in London, expressed the complete agreement of the Foreign Office in the procedure discussed between Count Berchtold and the Russian Ambassador.

But it is furthermore a fact that the Russian "Orange Book" shows not a trace of this decisive attitude of concession on the part of Austria-Hungary, and finally, that this attitude of concession on the part of Austria-Hungary was answered by the Russian Government with the general mobilization which made the war inevitable.

#### **Blames Russian War Party.**

To this is to be attributed the fact that the general mobilization came as a complete surprise to the two Entente associates of Russia who, according to their own documents, had welcomed the conciliatory spirit of Austria-Hungary with great satisfaction as a hope of peace. Proof of this: On July 31 at 7 o'clock in the evening, the German Ambassador at Paris spoke to the French President of Ministers and Foreign Minister, M. Viviani, to inform him that Germany was compelled by the general mobilization of Russia to proclaim the state of threatening danger of war, and to demand that Russia demobilize.

To this M. Viviani replied:

That he was in no way informed of the alleged mobilization of the Russian Army and Navy (nullement renseigné sur une prétendue mobilisation totale de l'armée et de la flotte russes,) ("Yellow Book," No. 117.)

The English Ambassador at Paris, too, reported late in the evening of July 31 to the Foreign Office that his colleague Iswolsky was not in the slightest aware of a general Russian mobilization. ("Blue Book," No. 117.)

If, therefore, the reasons alleged by Russia for the sudden general mobilization were merely transparent pretexts, and if Russia broke the momentous measure in question across its knee without even informing England and France at that moment, when an English proposal for mediation that was full of hope had been spread out, and when the compliance of Austria-Hungary effected by Germany must have obviated the acute danger of war, then there remains only one explanation for this:

The personages who had the deciding voice at that moment in Russia, in view of the compliance of the Austro-Hungarian Government that was manifesting itself as a result of German efforts, desired to break off all the bridges that led to peace and to make the war inevitable.

If this patent conclusion needed a further corroboration, that would be provided by the attitude of Russia after the transmission of the German ultimatum.

While Germany, which had heretofore designated the Russian mobilization as a *casus belli*, was content for the time being to proclaim the state of threatening danger of war, which is not yet equivalent to mobilization, and left the Russian Government twelve hours (ending at noon on Aug. 1) in which to rescind its mobilization, Russia left the German Ambassador without any answer whatsoever, and made no attempt whatever to avert the utmost extreme by the intermediation of a third party; but, on the other hand, in the night of Aug. 1 to 2 opened hostilities at three points on the Prussian frontier.

In the face of this indisputable state of facts, the French Government dares to offer the following presentation of the case (Circular note of the French Government of Aug. 1, "Yellow Book," No. 120):

Austria-Hungary has at last allowed itself to be found ready to

discuss materially the contents of its ultimatum to Serbia. Russia is ready, on the basis of the English proposal, to enter into negotiations ("le Gouvernement russe est prêt à entrer en négociation sur la base de la proposition anglaise.") Unfortunately, these prospects for a peaceful solution are destroyed by the ultimatum of Germany which demands demobilization of Russia. The ultimatum is unjustified, since Russia has accepted the English proposition which includes a stopping of military preparations ("puisque la Russie a accepté la proposition anglaise qui implique un arrêt des préparatifs militaires de toutes les puissances.") Germany's attitude proves that it wants the war.

History in the making can scarcely be falsified more lightly than this.

It is true, to be sure, that Austria-Hungary showed itself to be compliant and thereby gave all justification to hope for peace. But the French circular note keeps quiet the fact that this compliance is to be traced to the influence of Germany; the French Foreign Minister had even the face to assert in the Chamber of Deputies on Aug. 4 that Germany—from July 24 until its ultimatum handed in on July 31, under the pretext (!) of the general mobilization ordered by Russia—had not participated by any positive actions in the pacific conciliatory efforts of the Triple Entente ("Yellow Book," No. 159.)

It is false that Russia accepted the English proposition which included the cessation of military preparations by all the powers and that thereby it deprived the German ultimatum in advance of all justification.

In the second place, the English proposition above mentioned ("Blue Book," No. 103) did not contain the condition of the stopping of all military preparations, but rather only the earnest hope was expressed by Sir Edward Grey that with the acceptance of his proposition the military preparations would be halted by all sides. Furthermore, Russia did not accept the English proposition, neither before nor after the transmission of the German ultimatum; the circular note of Viviani, ("Yellow Book," No. 120,) which in its fifth paragraph asserts the completed acceptance of the English proposition, itself states in its fourth paragraph that the Russian Government was "prêt à entre en négociation sur la base de la proposition anglaise," and certainly there is a difference between the acceptance of a proposition and the willingness to negotiate on the

basis thereof. But, as a matter of fact, Russia's Foreign Minister did not even declare himself ready to enter upon negotiations on the basis of the English proposition; rather, he made a counter-proposal to the English Ambassador, which differed essentially from the English proposition, as the following comparison shows:

Russian Counter-Proposition,  
 ("Orange Book," No. 67.)

Si l'Autriche consent à arrêter la marche de ses armées sur le territoire serbe, (If Austria consents to halt the advance of its armies on Serbian territory,)

et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question européenne, (and if, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the character of a European question,)

elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie, (Austria admits that the great powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia could accord to the Government of Austria-Hungary,)

sans laisser porter atteinte à ses droits d'Etat souverain et à son indépendance, (without injury to its rights as a sovereign State and its independence,)

la Russie s'engage à conserver son attitude expectante, (Russia engages to maintain its expectant attitude,)

English Proposition,  
 ("Blue Book," No. 103.)

Austria, after taking Belgrade and Serbian territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further.

Sir Edward Grey had not asked for this recognition, and the Austro-Hungarian Government had steadily declined to permit its conflict with Serbia to be treated as a European question—

while powers endeavored to arrange that Serbia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria—

this condition which, moreover, had already been fulfilled by the declaration of the Austro-Hungarian Government, did not figure in the English proposition, but rather there was therein provided that Austria-Hungary, after satisfaction had been received, was to evacuate again the occupied Serbian territory. ("Territory occupied would of course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied.")

—which expectant attitude heretofore had consisted in the progress of the warlike preparations up to the general mobilization.

Such a counter-proposition, which is marked by an almost classical naïveté, the French Government before its diplomatic representatives, its Chamber, and the civilized world calls: the acceptance of the English proposition which included the stopping of military preparations.

That Russia, moreover, did not even think of stopping its military preparations is confirmed by M. Sazonof himself very emphatically on July 31, on the occasion of the presentation of his counter-proposition to the English Ambassador, in declaring to him "it was of course impossible to stop a mobilization which was already in progress."

No distortion, no matter how unabashed, can obscure the fact that after the Austro-Hungarian attitude of conciliation induced by Germany had given anew ground to hope for the maintenance of peace, Russia, without notifying either its opponent or its allies, precipitated the general mobilization that sealed the war, whilst Germany refrained with its counter-measures to the very limit of self-preservation. The authoritative circles of Russia wanted the war, and wanted it with redoubled brutality when the prospect of a peaceful settlement showed itself.

#### **The Accomplices.**

If the foregoing deductions, which one and all are based solely upon the documents of the Triple Entente Governments, show the incontrovertible certainty that the authoritative circle in Russia wanted the war and forced it, there arises the question how this determination, so universally momentous in its responsibilities, came to be adopted.

The compelling reason of self-preservation will not hold, for Russia was menaced by no one.

The protection of Serbia also will not hold, for, aside from the fact that Serbia stood in no relationship of protection that imposed protection, morally or politically, upon Russia as a duty, Austria-Hungary had pledged itself to the various great powers to preserve the integrity and sovereignty of Serbia.

Even the maintenance of the Russian prestige in the Balkans was, after the attitude of conciliation shown by Austria-Hungary, no longer an issue that could justify an appeal to arms.

The bringing on of the war was, therefore, for Russia a question pure and simple of opportunity. In lack of compelling reasons,

the decision for the war could only be brought about by the conviction: the opportunity is favorable for forcing down those great powers which appeared to the authoritative Russian personages as obstacles in their course.

Left to depend upon itself alone, Russia would have risked the war with Austria-Hungary and Germany only in an extreme case in the defense of national vital interests, but never as a result of weighing the probable result. Only the assurance of the active co-operation of other great powers could therefore have made possible the determination of the leading circles of Russia for war. The attitude of the two other powers of the Triple Entente must therefore be of decisive influence for the Russian determination.

Of this the documents of the Triple Entente Governments contain the corroboration.

The co-operation of France was by no means assured a priori, much less the co-operation of England. The Franco-Russian treaty of alliance did not pledge France to an unconditional accompaniment of Russia in war, and between Russia and England there existed no sort of precise agreement. In the Austro-Hungarian-Serbian conflict that arose out of the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian heir apparent and his wife, the sympathies of those not directly concerned could only be on the side of Austria-Hungary. On that point they were clear also in Russia, and this clearness of view was shown by the fact that the Russian Government, after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia, displayed a certain caution for a time.

#### **French Circular Note.**

Thus the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg wired to his Government on July 24 ("Yellow Book," No. 31,) after Sazonof had received cognizance of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia, that the dispositions of the Czar and his Ministers were of the most peaceful; and on July 25 ("Yellow Book," No. 38):

M. Sazonof garde toute sa modération: Il faut éviter, m'a-t-il dit, tout ce qui pourrait précipiter la crise. J'estime que, même si le Gouvernement austro-hongrois passait à l'action contre la Serbie, nous ne devrions pas rompre les négociations (M. Sazonof maintains all his moderation: It is necessary, he told me, to avoid everything that can precipitate the crisis. I am of the opinion that even if the Austro-Hungarian Government should pass to action against Serbia we should not break off negotiations).

On July 26 the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote in a circular note ("Yellow Book," No. 50):

De Pétersbourg nous apprenons que M. Sazonof a conseillé à la Serbie de demander la médiation anglaise. Dans le Conseil des Ministres du 25, tenu en présence de l'Empereur, la mobilisation de treize corps d'armée éventuellement destinés à opérer contre l'Autriche a été envisagée; cette mobilisation ne serait toutefois rendue effective que si l'Autriche contraignait la Serbie par la force des armes, et seulement après avis du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à qui le soin incombe de fixer la date, liberté lui étant laissée de continuer les négociations même dans le cas où Belgrade serait occupée. (From St. Petersburg we learn that M. Sazonof has advised Servia to ask for English mediation. In the Council of Ministers of the 25th, held in the presence of the Emperor, the mobilization of thirteen army corps, eventually destined against Austria, was envisaged; but this mobilization is to become effective only if Austria does violence to Serbia, and only according to the advice of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to whom shall be left the fixing of the date, in which he is at liberty to continue the negotiations even in the case of the occupation of Belgrade.)

That this moderation was not genuine appears even from the fact that M. Sazonof as early as the 24th of July declared to the English Ambassador ("Blue Book," No. 6): "that Russian mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out," from which it appears that the Russian mobilization was already in progress on July 24, the day on which the Austro-Hungarian note was announced, whilst the French circular note of July 26 ("Yellow Book," No. 50) has the partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary "envisaged" only on July 25, and makes its going into force contingent upon the Austrian force of arms against Serbia and the advice of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is nevertheless important, however, that the Russian and French Governments at that time still wished to call attention to the outward moderation.

The reason is manifestly that the Russian Government at that time was not yet sure of the co-operation of the English Government, and even of that of the French Government. In the conversation which Sazonof at his request had on July 24 at the house of the French Ambassador with the latter and Sir G. Buchanan, ("Blue Book," No. 6,) Sazonof demanded that England should declare its solidarity with Russia and France, whereupon Buchanan very shrewdly replied:

I could not, of course, speak in the name of his Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from his Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by arms. Direct British interests in Serbia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion.

How the French Ambassador acted towards M. Sazonof cannot be established absolutely, for the French "Yellow Book" significantly contains no report about this important conversation, and Sir G. Buchanan confines himself in his report to saying that his French colleague had given him to understand ("gave me to understand") that France would fulfill all duties imposed by its alliance with Russia. Such an attitude left open the neutrality of France in a Russian war of aggression. As a matter of fact, as we shall see later, France gave to the Russian Government its consent to unconditional armed help only at a later stage of the case.

We shall now consider how the attitude of France and England developed.

#### **France.**

The French Government manifestly found itself in a heavy dilemma. On the one side its entire policy for decades was based upon the closest junction with Russia; on the other hand, there weighed heavily the responsibility to take a stand unconditionally with Russia in the bad Serbian matter and to risk alone with Russia a war against Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Therefore the French statesmen were moved by a double fear: the fear of awakening distrust in the Russian Government, and of isolating France by a loosening of the Franco-Russian relation; the second, the fear of standing alone with Russia in a war against Germany and Austria-Hungary.

The effect of the first fear was that the French Government refused to attempt any influence in St. Petersburg in a pacific sense, which might there be interpreted as a defection of France from Russia. The various urgent steps taken by the German Ambassador in Paris after the handing over of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia, in order to impress upon the French Cabinet the gravity of the situation and to point out how necessary a moderating influence of France was in St. Petersburg, were always received with the greatest distrust and suspected of being attempts to drive a wedge between France and Russia.

When, after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia, the German Ambassador in Paris gave to the French Government the correct and faithful explanation that the German Government regarded the matter as one that should be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and desired urgently the localization of the conflict, since every intervention of another power might, by the natural play of the existing alliances, bring on incalculable consequences, the echo of this communication was an article in the "Echo de Paris," the intimate relations of which to the Quai d'Orsay are well known. In this article, the step of the German Ambassador was branded as a "menace allemande." ("Yellow Book," No. 36.)

When, two days later, on July 26, the German Ambassador suggested to the French Government to interfere with the Russian Government in a pacific sense, and added that Austria-Hungary, according to the declarations given to Russia, was seeking neither territorial aggrandizement nor impairment of the integrity of Serbia, but only to safeguard itself, the answer was that Russia had done nothing that could cause apprehension concerning its moderation; but that Germany should intervene in Vienna in order to prevent military operations against Serbia ("Yellow Book," No. 56.) And when the German Ambassador, warned by the attitude of the "Echo de Paris," made the proposition to issue a notice to the press concerning the conversation, in which notice it should be said that he had in a new conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs examined in a friendly spirit and with the feeling of pacific solidarity the means of preserving peace, then the thought of the public announcement of a "solidarité pacifique" with Germany awakened a veritable terror ("Yellow Book," No. 57,) and the notice suggested by the German Ambassador was finally issued to the press without the suspicious expression concerning the solidarity and the friendly spirit: "Cette rédaction, volontairement terne, évitait une solidarité l'Allemagne qui pourrait être mal interprétée" ("this purposely colorless editing avoided a solidarity with Germany which might be falsely interpreted.") So to be read in a circular note which the French Foreign Office addressed to its foreign embassies concerning this important case. ("Yellow Book," No. 62.) The same circular note adds that the probable explanation of Herr von Schoen's step was that he was seeking to compromise France in the eyes of Russia ("à compromettre la France au

regard de la Russie.") The French Foreign Minister, p. i., announces in a further circular note of July 29 his pride that the German Ambassador had sought in vain to draw Germany into a Franco-German action toward solidarity in St. Petersburg, ("a vainement tenté de nous entraîner dans une action solidaire franco-allemande à Petersbourg.") He repeats the assertion that the Russian Government had given the greatest proofs of its moderation and that Russia in no way threatened the peace, but that on the other hand negotiations must be conducted in Vienna and that all danger emanated from Vienna. ("Yellow Book," No. 85.)

From no document of the French "Yellow Book," and as little from the Russian "Orange Book" and the English "Blue Book," does it appear that France at any stage ventured to give the Russian Government an earnest counsel in a pacific sense, unless it be considered that the expression of the wish that Russia might avoid measures which could give Germany a pretext for mobilization ("Yellow Book," No. 102) be regarded as a sincere mediation for peace, while as a matter of fact such wishes are more properly to be regarded as tactical hints to detain Germany until the assurance of armed help from England, toward which France was at that time working with all means at its disposal, should be attained.

The unconditional safeguarding of the English alliance, not any mediatory activity whatsoever, was in those critical days the goal of the labors of French diplomats; and as long as this goal was not attained, the decisive word to Russia was also not uttered. No matter if the impression is given a hundred times in the French "Yellow Book" that French assistance of Russia was axiomatic, so axiomatic that a special declaration on this point to Russia—which one seeks in vain in the French "Yellow Book"—was not at all necessary—but the Russian "Orange Book" knows better. In this there is contained a telegraphic statement of Sazonof to Isvolsky, printed as of June 29, ("Orange Book," No. 58,) and that, too, as the last of the ten documents dated July 29, so that we may assume that this telegram was dispatched only late in the evening of July 29. In the statement Isvolsky is authorized

d'exprimer au Gouvernement française notre sincère reconnaissance pour la déclaration que l'Ambassadeur de France m'a faite en son nom en disant que nous pouvons compter entièrement sur l'appui de notre alliée la France (to express to the French Government our sincere gratitude for the declaration which the French Ambassador has

made to me in its name, that we may count upon the full and complete support of France as our ally.)

Sazonof added:

Dans les circonstances actuelles cette déclaration nous est particulièrement précieuse (under the present circumstances this declaration is especially precious to us.)

From this it appears that France on the evening of July 29, not earlier and not later, gave to Russia expressly and without conditions its declaration of armed assistance.

Why not earlier? And why did France on July 29 find the ability to make up its mind to this decisive step?

The key lies with

#### **England.**

The relation of France to England bears, since 1905, the official name of the "entente cordiale." A good understanding, not an alliance. In the English Parliament, the Ministers responsible for the foreign policy have always declared that there existed no treaty obligation whatsoever for the cordial good understanding between the two nations; for England there was said to be no binding obligation; Parliament's power of decision was said to have been encroached upon in advance in no way.

Today we know more.

Between Sir Edward Grey as Secretary of State of the British Foreign Office and M. Paul Cambon as Ambassador of the French Republic letters were exchanged on November 22 and 23, 1912, of which the letter of Grey—which Paul Cambon merely confirms in approximately the same words—may here be inserted. ("Blue Book," No. 105, Annex 1:)

Foreign Office, Nov. 22, 1912.

My dear Ambassador:

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the

French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to coöperate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve the peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them. Yours,  
E. GREY.

This historical document shows that the British and French army and admiralty staffs had worked out and agreed upon plans for joint action by land and sea. There could be no doubt as to who was the sole opponent against whom these plans were to be directed. The plans made in common were kept alive by regularly recurring conferences between the English and French military and naval authorities. The details for effecting joint action of the land and sea forces of both sides were not formulated, but the decision of the question whether or not there was to be such joint action was left for the moment when an emergency should arise.

Thus the English Government was justified in maintaining that she had made no actual alliance with France. But it is clear that the arrangement of operations in common between two great powers and the continuous consultation regarding such plans of operation cannot be a mere way of passing the time. Even if nothing else is taken into consideration but the intimate knowledge which each must obtain of the strength of the other, it is clear that such conduct can be possible only if both sides are seriously considering acting together. To throw more light on the actual meaning of the correspondence—in itself not binding—attention may also be called to the fact that France, trusting to the plan of operations agreed upon with England, concentrated her fleet in the Mediterranean and left the protection of her channel and Atlantic seaboard to the English fleet. Was not England at least morally bound by this very definite fact?

**Grey's Early Moves.**

Sophists try to deceive not only others but themselves. Sir Edward Grey, at the beginning of the conflict, seems to have tried to make himself believe that he possessed a freedom which he really did not. Only by bearing this in mind can one explain his taking upon himself the rôle—foredoomed to failure—of wishing to be a mediator in a case to which he was in reality a party.

Whether he wished it or not, this dual attitude was bound to lead to insincerity.

All one has to do is to refer to the English "Blue Book," No. 17, in order to see how Sir G. Buchanan, on July 25th, answered Mr. Sazonof's urging that England make clear that it stood with France and Russia:

I said that England could play the rôle of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as a friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once.

Such a mediator can certainly not be called an "honest broker."

In addition to the fact that Sir Edward Grey, on account of his entente position toward France and also toward Russia, had not the impartiality and inner freedom which alone could have qualified him for the rôle he desired of mediator and judge in the Serbian dispute—a rôle which he had already played in other disputes—he was, granting the sincerity of his peaceful inclinations, in a difficult position toward his colleagues in the Cabinet, whose attitude toward the question of peace or war was not unanimous, as was proved later to the entire world by the retirement of the three friends of peace.

At first Sir Edward made some resistance to the urging of Russia and France for an immediate declaration of solidarity. He thoroughly approved of the explanations given on July 24 by Buchanan to Sazonof, of which the most important was the one to the effect that England could scarcely agree to being unconditionally bound to give France and Russia armed support, because public opinion in England would not sanction a war on account of Serbia ("Blue Book," No. 6.) In fact, he expressly states:

I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Serbian quarrel. ("Blue Book," No. 24.)

England's position had a most disagreeable effect in St. Petersburg and Paris, as was shown, not in the documents made public at that time, but in the statements of the press.

Russian and French diplomacy sought to influence Sir Edward Grey by the assertion that the peril lay in the fact that the German Government might consider it a foregone conclusion that England would not intervene; that, as soon as England should determinedly support Russia and France, Germany would bring pressure to bear on Austria-Hungary, and, in this way, the danger of war would be averted ("Blue Book," No. 17.) Even as late as July 27 Sir G. Buchanan answered Mr. Sazonof on the subject of this ever-recurring line of argument, in a thoroughly pertinent manner, by saying that he was mistaken if he thought such a course would help the cause of peace; that, by such a threat, Germany's attitude would merely be stiffened. ("Blue Book," No. 44.)

While the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg was stating only what was self-evident, namely, that an English threat against Germany would both fail of its intended effect and make the critical situation even worse, London began to yield to the pressure of France and Russia.

First, Sir Edward Grey lent ear to Paul Cambon's plan of a conference, expressed in the following form: the British Cabinet was to request the German Government "to take the initiative in offering at Vienna mediation between Austria and Serbia by the four powers not directly interested. ("Yellow Book," No. 32.) This project was futile from the very start, since it not only presupposed Germany's taking an initiative toward her ally which France had refused with alarm to take toward Russia, but also ignored the fact that Austria-Hungary was known to have taken the stand that intervention or mediation of third parties in her conflict with Serbia could not be accepted. Austria-Hungary, moreover, by accepting the Grey-Cambon proposal, would thereby have recognized Russia as a power directly interested in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, which was diametrically opposed to Austro-Hungarian conceptions and intentions. Paul Cambon, however, by luring Sir Edward Grey onto this thin ice, succeeded, in view of the fact that Germany's refusal of the proposal was beyond doubt, in making the attitude of the English Cabinet toward Germany more unfriendly.

Besides, a certain amount of encouragement to France and

Russia emanated from the British Government. What influences were at work there is shown by the agreement between two telegrams ("Yellow Book," Nos. 63 and 66) which the French Chargé d'Affaires in London sent to his Government on July 27th.

No. 63.

London, July 27, 1914.

The German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors give it to be understood that they are certain that England will observe neutrality if a conflict break out. Sir Arthur Nicolson told me that Prince Lichnowsky, however, after the conversation he had with him today, could not preserve any doubt as to the liberty of intervention which the British Government intends to keep, should it deem intervention necessary.

The German Ambassador cannot have failed to be struck by this declaration, but, so as to bring pressure upon Germany, and so as to avoid a conflict, it appears indispensable that Germany should be led to hold it for certain that she would find England and Russia by the side of France.

No. 66.

London, July 27, 1914.

Sir Edward Grey this morning told the German Ambassador that if Austria invaded Serbia after the Serbian reply, she would prove that she was not merely seeking a settlement of the questions mentioned in her note of July 23, but that she wished to crush a small State. "Then," he added, "a European question would be raised and a war would ensue in which all the powers would take part." The attitude of Great Britain is defined by the stoppage of the demobilization of her fleet. The First Lord of the Admiralty on Friday already discreetly took this step on his own initiative. Tonight Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues decided to publish this news. This result is due to the conciliatory attitude of Serbia and Russia.

Attention is called to the nuances in the statements of Grey and Nicolson to the French Chargé d'Affaires: Nicolson claims to have given the German Ambassador explanations which should have left no doubt in the latter's mind that England reserved her freedom to interfere. Grey claims only to have spoken "other powers" might also take part in a war. (Note 4.)

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[Note 4.—The French Government had an English translation made of its "Yellow Book" by The London Times and declared explicitly on the title page that this translation was "authorized." In this translation the following:

"une guerre à laquelle d'autres Puissances seraient amenées à prendre part,"

But of more importance than this difference between the more emphatic tone of Nicolson, known as one of the fathers of the Russian-English rapprochement, and the milder tone of Grey, is the fact that the First Lord of the Admiralty, on his own initiative, and early as July 24, postponed the dispersal of the fleet which had been gathered for maneuvers; and still more important is the fact that, on July 27, Sir Edward Grey felt called upon to announce this measure, kept secret up to then, to the French Chargé d'Affaires, as a consequence of the good relations between Russia and Serbia. Grey also informed the Russian Ambassador of this on the same day, and communicated the following on the subject to Buchanan:

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce. This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for maneuver leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised. ("Blue Book," No. 47.)

One can imagine what inferences the Russian and French Governments drew from the continued state of mobilization of the English North Sea fleet, and from the announcement of this measure, despite the reservation with which Sir Edward Grey deemed it best to impart the information. The action of the First Lord of the Admiralty and the sanctioning and announcement of that action by the British Cabinet carried more weight than all cautious statements.

During the following two days the war party in the English Cabinet must have won the upper hand even more; for, on July

is translated:

"a war in which all the powers would take part";

Thus, the original French version, "a war in which other powers might be led to take part,"

was translated, with the authorization of the French Government, into:

"a war in which all powers would take part."

By this retouching, and for obvious reasons, a clearness of speech is attributed to Sir Edward Grey on July 27 which in reality he did not find until later.]

29, Sir Edward Grey took a step which could leave no doubt as to England's being on the side of her associates in the Entente. On that day Grey had a conference with Prince Lichnowsky concerning which he himself informed the English Ambassador at Berlin ("Blue Book," No. 89):

After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation—which I hoped would continue—in thinking that we should stand aside.

This announcement left nothing to be desired so far as clearness was concerned.

Now clearness in difficult situations may be an advantage and lead to disentanglement. But if that was the object of Sir Edward Grey, what evil spirit prompted him to say to the French Ambassador on the morning of July 29 that he would summon the German Ambassador and make this "quite private and friendly" announcement to him!

#### **Die Cast for War.**

Sir Edward Grey himself informs the English Ambassador at Paris that he had acted thus ("Blue Book," No. 29):

After telling M. Cambon today how grave the situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador today that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed.

With that France must have felt sure that she could count on the armed support of England, in case she might in any way be drawn into the conflict. One seeks in vain in the French "Yellow Book" for a dispatch from Paul Cambon concerning this most important negotiation during the entire critical week; one also seeks there in vain for the instructions concerning it given in Paris to St. Petersburg. But the bullet shot from London on July 29 appears on the evening of the same day in St. Petersburg, in the telegram wherein Sazonof commissions Isvolsky to express to the

French Government the sincere gratitude of the Russian Government for the declaration of unconditional armed support. ("Orange Book," No. 58.)

Now the die had been cast for war. As early as July 25 Sazonof had declared to the English Ambassador: "If Russia feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war," ("Blue Book," No. 17.) Matters then had come to this pass, thanks to the certainty, reached at last, that the entry of France into the war would cause England to break loose, France had promised armed support to Russia, and, in connection therewith, doubtless observed that English aid could also be counted upon. (Note 5.)

To his report to Paul Cambon regarding his contemplated announcement to Prince Lichnowsky, Sir Edward Grey added some statements which at first sight seem to be somewhat analogous to the reservation made by him when he announced to the Russian Ambassador the continued state of mobilization of the English fleet. He pointed out that public opinion in England looked upon the difficulties of that time in a different way from that in which they had looked upon the Morocco crisis. Then it had seemed as if Germany wished to crush France on account of a question which was the substance of a special agreement between England and France. But now the question dealt primarily with a question between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, perhaps also with one between Russia and Germany, and England felt no call to interfere. And even if France were drawn in on account of her duties as an ally, England had not as yet decided what was to be done; the matter was one that must be reflected upon; England was untrammelled by obligations and must decide what was to the advantage of British interests; that he had felt it necessary to say this in order not to let Cambon harbor the belief that a decision had been arrived at regarding this point.

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[Note 5.—A report captured in Germany after the outbreak of war from the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg, M. de l'Escaille, dated July 30, contains full confirmation of this interconnection. This report reads: "England first gave to understand that she would not allow herself to be drawn into a conflict. Sir G. Buchanan said this openly. Today (on July 30) St. Petersburg is firmly convinced, and has even received assurances thereof, that England will line up with France. This help is of decisive importance and has contributed materially to the triumph of the war party."]

How Cambon took this is shown by his answer. Sir Edward Grey himself wires concerning this to the British Ambassador at Paris, ("Blue Book," No. 87) :

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav, we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do.

In fact M. Cambon fully understood Sir Edward Grey, even regarding that which he did not state, viz.: the English Cabinet, in view of public opinion, needs another reason for interference beside a Serbian-Austro-Hungarian or Russian-German conflict; such reason can and must be provided. At all events England looks upon a conflict in which Germany and France are also arrayed against each other as a question involving the hegemony of Europe, in which the decisions still to be made by the English Government become clear.

The intelligent M. Cambon did not delay then, after assurances of French armed support to Russia had been given as a result of this interview with Sir Edward Grey, in seeking other issues for the spreading conflagration. On the next day, July 30, he presented to Sir Edward Grey the correspondence of November, 1912, accompanied by a notice of the Paris Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding alleged German preparations for war on the German-French frontier, (Note 6) and with his characteristic penetration he foresaw that Germany would now attack France, either by demanding the cessation of French preparations for war, or by demanding a declaration of neutrality from France in the event of a German-Russian war. France would have to reject both of these. ("Blue Book," No. 105.)

#### **Criticises Sir Edward Grey.**

Thus a threatening attack on France and an imperiling of European peace, the two assumed situations in which, should they

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[Note 6.—This notice, in the form in which it has been made public in the English "Blue Book," must have been fabricated subsequently, for the reasons stated hereinbefore in Note 1.]

occur, England and France had agreed to decide whether or not they should act jointly with land and sea forces, had indeed arisen, according to the view of the French Government. After the interview on July 29 between Grey and Cambon the decision of the English Cabinet could no longer be in doubt.

Did Sir Edward Grey know that on July 29 the French Government offered Russia her unconditional support, with which Russia was resolved to run all the risks of a war? If so, had he any thought of succeeding when, on July 30, he telegraphed to Buchanan that he urgently recommend to the Russian Government the project for mediation emanating from the interview with the German Ambassador? If Sir Edward Grey was in earnest here in his attempt to reach an understanding at the last moment on this basis, and if he really sincerely welcomed the admission secured from Count Berchtold through the intervention of the German Emperor that he would discuss with Russia the ultimatum to Serbia, what feelings must have been aroused in him by the fact that the Russian Government, in spite of the possibilities of peace yet existing and of his own urging, ordered general mobilization on July 31, thus making inevitable a war to which, in accordance with all that had gone before, England must also be a party?

If the sudden and unprecedentedly grave step by Russia aroused any feelings at all in Sir Edward Grey, one must acknowledge that he was able to master them. At all events there is no trace of any such feelings in the "Blue Book," nor any trace of remonstrance against Russia's step which spoiled everything, nor of any endeavor to plead with Russia that she cease the mobilization which had been ordered or make satisfactory explanations to Germany.

On the contrary Grey made the attempt, hopeless from the start, of continuing the negotiations and keeping mobilized Germany quiet. This last was refused by Germany. Secretary of State von Jagow declared to Sir E. Goschen that Russia said that her mobilization did not necessarily mean war, since Russia could well remain some months in a state of mobilization without waging war, but that this was not the case with Germany, that Germany's advantage was speed, Russia's numbers, and the security of Germany forbade her to allow Russia to collect her masses of troops from all parts of her great Empire ("Blue Book," No. 138.)

Moreover, now that the die had been cast, Sir Edward Grey concentrated his endeavors upon playing his cards in such a way

that an occasion should be provided for the immediate entry of England into the war, which should appear conclusive to the still reluctant part of the English Cabinet and of English public opinion.

The "Blue" and "Yellow" books together show that Grey, who had been as closely bound morally as it is possible to be to Paul Cambon since the 29th of July, found some difficulty in persuading the English Cabinet that the mere entry of France into the war was sufficient reason for the active participation of England. It was clear that there was not sufficient support in the English Cabinet for Cambon's view that a war in which France and Germany were involved meant a fight for the hegemony of Europe to which England could not remain indifferent—a view to which Grey had not demurred (see above.)

The embarrassment of Grey was increased by very far-reaching assurances which Germany held out for the event of a declaration of neutrality by England. On July 29, when the "friendly and private" statements of Grey to Prince Lichnowsky were as yet unknown in Berlin, the Imperial Chancellor made a proposal to Sir E. Goschen which was calculated to make British neutrality possible. ("Blue Book," No. 85.) The Chancellor pointed out that a Russian attack on Austria-Hungary would probably lead to a European conflagration, since Germany was bound to give armed support to her ally. The Chancellor added that it was clear to him that England would not view with indifference any possible conflict in which France was to be destroyed, but that the destruction of France was not Germany's aim, and, provided that English neutrality were assured, all possible assurances could be given the British Government that Germany contemplated absolutely no territorial increase at the expense of France, even if Germany emerged victorious from such a war. The Chancellor refused, after a request by Goschen, to make a like assurance regarding the French colonies, a refusal which later was not maintained. The Chancellor declared further that Germany would respect the neutrality of Holland so long as it should be respected by others, and, as for Belgium, whatever operations Germany might be obliged to undertake there would depend on how France acted, but that, after the war, Belgium's integrity would be respected, provided that Belgium had not taken up arms against Germany.

This offer was most peremptorily rejected by Sir Edward Grey,

("Blue Book," No. 101.) Goschen was instructed to inform the Chancellor respecting the assurances regarding France:

It would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

He added that it was likewise out of the question that England should bargain regarding her duties and interests in connection with Belgian neutrality.

The vehemence of expression in the refusal of the German proposal is significant: Sir Edward Grey looked upon himself as an ally of France who was to be tempted to break faith. But he was determined to make of Belgian neutrality the issue which he needed in order to bring the Cabinet and public opinion into the war.

No. 113 of the "Blue Book" contains the telegram from St. Petersburg concerning the order for general mobilization of Russia's forces.

No. 114 of the "Blue Book" contains a telegram of Sir Edward Grey to the Ambassadors at Berlin and Paris, reading as follows:

Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I still trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilization in Germany it becomes essential to his Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Government is prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other power violates it.

Thus Grey's answer to the Russian mobilization was not a step in St. Petersburg but the raising of the question of Belgian neutrality in Berlin—in Paris the question was self-evidently a farce—in order to create the pretext for England's intervention.

In fact, it was high time for something to happen in this direction, for the French Ambassador, who had acted immediately upon the fateful statement of Grey on July 29, and irrevocably committed France, and who had presented the correspondence of November, 1912, to Sir Edward Grey on July 30, and asked for its acceptance, became impatient when Sir Edward, forced by a Cabinet decision, made excuses. Grey telegraphed on July 31 to the English Ambassador in Paris ("Blue Book," No. 114) that Paul Cambon had shown a telegram of Jules Cambon from Berlin—evidently a put-up job—according to which Germany had been encouraged by the

uncertainty as to England's intervention. Sir Edward protested and told Paul Cambon that he had, on that same morning, definitely refused in the presence of the German Ambassador to make any declarations of neutrality and had even stated that, if Germany and France became involved in a war, England would be drawn into it; but that this, however, was not to be construed as meaning an agreement with France. He told Paul Cambon further that the Cabinet had decided that it could not bind itself in any way at that moment. "Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved." But, he added significantly, further events might change the situation and convince Government and Parliament that intervention was justified. Belgium's neutrality might be, in determining England's attitude, "I would not say a decisive, but an important factor."

#### **On the Eve of War.**

How little Paul Cambon was satisfied with this answer is shown by his own report on the interview, ("Yellow Book," No. 110.) He asked Grey whether England would wait before intervening until Germany attacked France.

I insisted on the fact that the measures already taken on our frontier by Germany revealed intentions of approaching aggression, and that if Europe's mistake in 1870 were to be avoided, it behooved England to consider from this moment under what conditions she would give us the help on which France counted.

But Grey stuck to the Cabinet decision. On the other hand, Sir Arthur Nicolson, whom Cambon met when he left the office of the Secretary of State, gave this much consolation: that the Council of Ministers would meet again next day, "and confidentially he gave me to understand that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would not fail to reopen the discussion."

It is hardly necessary here to read between the lines.

Before the meeting of the Council of Ministers announced for the next day by Nicolson, answers arrived from Paris and Berlin to Grey's question as to Belgian neutrality. Naturally, the French Government emphatically promised to respect Belgian neutrality. In Berlin, on the other hand, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated to the English Ambassador that he must first consult the Emperor and Chancellor.

I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they return any answer at all. ("Blue Book," No. 122.)

This dispatch of Goschen left Berlin late on the evening of July 31, and, according to a note in the English "Blue Book," was received at the Foreign Office on Aug. 1.

The English echo followed promptly. The very next number in the "Blue Book" (123) contains a telegram from Grey to Goschen dated Aug. 1, according to which Sir Edward told Prince Lichnowsky that the answer of the German Government regarding Belgian neutrality was for him a matter of very great regret, since the neutrality of Belgium affected the feeling in England. If Germany could answer as France had done, this would contribute materially to lessening the anxiety and tension in England. On the other hand, if one belligerent should violate the neutrality of Belgium, while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to control public opinion in England. Prince Lichnowsky inquired in his turn whether, in case Germany bound herself to respect Belgian neutrality, England would bind herself to remain neutral. Grey evaded this, maintained that the hands of the English Government were still free, and that it was about to consider what it was going to do. He said that all he could say was that its attitude would be determined largely by public opinion, which deemed Belgian neutrality of great importance, but that he believed that England could not promise to preserve neutrality solely on this condition. Then, Prince Lichnowsky urgently inquired whether Grey would not state the conditions under which England would remain neutral. "He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed." But to this Grey replied: "I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free." Thus reads Sir Edward Grey's own report on this interview held on the morning of Aug. 1.

Germany went even further in the concession by which she wished to make English neutrality possible. On Aug. 4, 1914, the Imperial Chancellor announced in the Reichstag that he had offered to the English Government "that, so long as England remained neutral, our fleet will not attack the northern coast of France"; he added "that, so long as England remained neutral, we also were

ready, provided reciprocal measures were taken, not to engage in any hostile operations against the French merchant marine."

The English "Blue Book" makes no mention of these concessions. The question arises as to whether this concession was ever brought to the knowledge of the English Cabinet by Sir Edward Grey. That the omission cannot be laid at the door of the German Ambassador in London is shown by the French "Yellow Book" (No. 144,) wherein Paul Cambon reports under date of Aug. 3 that the German Ambassador had made a communication to the press stating that, if England remained neutral, Germany would forego all naval demonstrations and not use the Belgian coast as a point of support.

Thus Germany offered, in exchange for the neutrality of England, to respect the integrity of Belgium, and of France and her colonies, and also to forego all naval operations against the French coast and the French merchant marine, but English neutrality was not to be obtained at that or any other price, as Sir Edward clearly stated. "England wishes to keep her hands free," was the translation from the language of cant into that of sincerity of: "England is already bound to France."

On the day of the formal and categorical refusal to remain neutral under any conditions (Aug. 1,) Sir Edward Grey made the following announcement to Paul Cambon:

That he would inform the Cabinet of the unsatisfactory answer of Germany regarding Belgian neutrality and request to be empowered to say on Monday (Aug. 3) in the House of Commons that the British Government would not tolerate a violation of Belgian neutrality. That, moreover, the British squadrons were mobilized, and he wished to suggest to his colleagues a declaration to the effect that the British fleet would prevent the German fleet from passing through the Channel, or—should they pass through—from making any sort of demonstration on the French coast.

It cannot be assumed that it is customary in England for the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to impart beforehand to the representative of an interested foreign power matters of world-historical scope which he contemplates bringing up in the Cabinet council, and in this way to commit his country to a policy before the Cabinet has spoken. Such procedure is all the more remarkable when it has to do with decisions against which successful resistance had already been made by members of the Cabinet. If, notwith-

standing, Sir Edward Grey imparted this information on the morning of Aug. 1, thus forestalling the Cabinet, he at least could excuse himself by saying that he thereby bound himself no more deeply to France than he had already done.

At any rate, it is significant that the English "Blue Book" has no report from Sir Edward Grey to the British Ambassador at Paris on this interview with Paul Cambon, whereas Paul Cambon did not fail to report on it at once to his Government.

#### **England and Belgium.**

Paris had become so alarmed on account of the opposition in the English Cabinet that the English Ambassador there telegraphed to London on the evening of July 31 that the French Minister of Foreign Affairs was

urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will be in the circumstances and begs an answer may be made by his Majesty's Government at the earliest moment possible. ("Blue Book," No. 124.)

The answer was the unusual announcement of Sir Edward Grey to Paul Cambon on the morning of Aug. 1.

Now France was quieted and, without awaiting German mobilization, the French Government ordered, on Aug. 1 at 3:40 P.M., the general mobilization of the French Army. ("Blue Book," No. 136.)

On the next day, Sunday, Aug. 2, Sir Edward Grey made an announcement to the French Ambassador, which he repeated on Aug. 3, in the following more precise form:

In case the German fleet passes through the Channel or traverses the North Sea for the purpose of rounding the British Isles in order to attack the French coasts or the French Navy, and to alarm the French merchant marine, the English fleet would intervene and lend the French Navy its full protection, so that from that moment England and Germany would be at war. ("Yellow Book," No. 143.)

When he first made this statement Sir Edward Grey felt bound to add this explanation: The English Government was obliged to take into consideration far-reaching questions and difficult issues and felt that it could not bind itself necessarily to declare war on Germany, in case war should break out between France and Germany, but that it was important for the French Government,

whose fleet had been concentrated for a long time in the Mediterranean, to know what steps it was to take for the protection of its entirely unprotected northern coast. For this reason the English Government had considered itself bound to make the announcement mentioned. This did not bind England to enter into the war against Germany, unless the German fleet acted in the manner described in the declaration.

This comment shows to what a degree the agreements between France and England, though not formally binding, really constituted actual obligations. Merely on the basis of the plans of operations agreed upon between the French and English military and naval authorities which, in case of war, were not to impair the freedom of action of the two Governments, the French fleet had been concentrated in the Mediterranean. And now the British Cabinet felt itself obliged by this concentration to take over the protection of the French northern coast and merchant marine, and, on account of this, to enter possibly into a state of war with Germany.

Therefore, if during the time between Aug. 2 and 4 German warships had passed through the Strait of Calais or the North Sea, a state of war would immediately have arisen between Germany and England, since such an operation would have been immediately taken by the English to mean that the French coast or fleet was to be attacked or, at least, the French merchant marine to be alarmed; and this would have occurred solely because of the obligations which the English Cabinet felt to be imposed upon it by the entente with France, which, on its face, bound England to nothing; all this, moreover, quite irrespective of Germany's attitude toward Belgian neutrality.

But Belgian neutrality remained as a possible reason for war, which the majority of the English Cabinet felt must be entered upon, but for which an excuse must now be constructed and held in reserve. To be sure, Grey spoke to Cambon on Aug. 3 only about the sailing of the German fleet as a *casus belli*, whereas he did not even mention Belgian neutrality. On the other hand, he had expressed himself in the interview of Aug. 2 to the effect that the Cabinet was still considering what it was to say next day in Parliament, and whether it was to declare the violation of Belgian neutrality a *casus belli*, ("Blue Book," No. 148.) Thus Grey had not yet put through in the Cabinet his proposal, announced to the

French Ambassador on Aug. 31, that England was not to tolerate the violation of Belgian neutrality.

One must now deplore that in those days the German fleet did not come out and cause hostile action on the part of the English fleet. Then the fairy tale that England was forced to enter the war solely by the violation of Belgian neutrality at the hands of Germany could never have come up.

As matters developed, the second pretext for war, held ready by the leaders of English policy, became acute. The German Government found itself obliged, on account of the state of affairs which is already but too well known, to ask from Belgium permission for German troops to march through its territory. The King of the Belgians asked the King of England for diplomatic support for the protection of Belgian integrity. Thereupon the English Government demanded from the German Government an immediate declaration as to the respecting of Belgian neutrality. ("Blue Book," No. 156.) The German Ambassador made a final attempt by imparting to the English Government the text of a telegram from the Foreign Department asking him to reiterate most emphatically that, even in the event of armed conflict, Germany would under no circumstances annex Belgian territory. This telegram continued:

Please impress upon Sir Edward Grey that German Army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information, ("Blue Book," No. 157.)

This final attempt likewise failed. The English Government, as late as the evening of Aug. 4, presented an ultimatum to expire at midnight, at a time when German troops had already crossed the Belgian frontier. The war with England had begun!

That England would have entered the war even if Germany had not in any way violated the neutrality of Belgium needs no further proof after the development shown above of the French-English-German negotiations during the critical week. *The responsible directors of the British policy had so strongly committed England to an immediate armed intervention on the side of France during the days that elapsed after the handing of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia, and done so entirely on the basis of the entente with France which did not bind them formally to anything, that war could have been prevented only at the price of the fall of*

*the British Cabinet, and of the reproach to England of having acted perfidiously.*

That those who had brought England to this pass profited by working to the utmost the pretext of the violation of Belgian neutrality—which, as they admitted, they expected to influence public opinion strongly—in order to hide their responsibility is another matter. How insincere this pretext was has often enough been pointed out. In this connection attention may be called to the documents, captured in Brussels by German officials, which showed the existence of an agreement between English and Belgian military authorities similar in every way to the French-English agreement regarding joint action by the two general military and naval staffs. If, with regard to the English-Belgian military understanding, England maintains that the measures taken dealt exclusively with the possibility of a violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany, and that they were not in themselves binding in any way on the policy of the two Governments, this pretext is worth exactly as much as the similar one continually brought forward during a decade by English statesmen in Parliament and before public opinion regarding the character of the French-English entente. But in the case of Belgium the relationship is made particularly clear. Among the captured documents there is a record in the handwriting of Count von der Straaten, Director in the Belgian Foreign Office, of a conference between the English military attaché in Brussels, Lieut. Col. Bridges, and the Belgian Chief of the General Staff, General Jungbluth, on April 3, 1912. In this conference, according to the record of Count von der Straaten, Lieut. Col. Bridges stated:

The English Government during the recent events (Morocco crisis) would immediately have undertaken a landing in our country (Belgium), even if we had not asked for help.

The General objected, the record continues, that for this our consent was necessary.

The Military Attaché answered that he was aware of this; but, as we were not in a position to prevent the Germans from marching through our country, *England would have landed her troops in Belgium anyhow.*

There is nothing in Count von der Straaten's record to show that Belgium made any objection or reservation regarding this.

Thus England, in 1912, had decided to throw overboard Belgian

neutrality on account of which she ostensibly has gone to war, without the quiver of an eyelash. Belgium herself had most seriously compromised her neutrality by her military agreements with England. If England, despite this, wishes to make the world believe that she drew her sword to protect Belgium's neutrality, then she is playing the rôle of a seducer seeking to protect the innocence which he himself has seduced.

The document published by the Governments of the Triple Entente, then, provide the following outlines for a history of the beginnings of the European war :

1. Russia caused the war by the general mobilization ordered by her on July 31, which, as the Russian statesmen knew perfectly well, made war inevitable for Germany.

2. All the pretexts adduced by the Russian Government for the mobilization are weak. Neither Austro-Hungarian nor German military measures can be advanced as reasons for the general Russian mobilization. Instead, the Russian Government gave the order for general mobilization immediately after Austria-Hungary, through the efforts of the German Emperor at Vienna, had decided upon a decisively amenable attitude on the Serbian conflict, and had made known this resolve to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna. Thus Russia brought on war by her general mobilization at a moment when the hope of preserving peace had been resuscitated by a conciliatory step on the part of Austria-Hungary.

3. Russia, by her own statement, was resolved from the beginning of the crisis to face all risks of a war provided she were sure of help from France. The promise of unconditional armed support from France was received by Russia on the evening of July 29, coupled in all probability with the announcement that France would have England on her side.

4. France gave her promise of unconditional armed support of Russia only when the French Government considered itself assured of the coöperation of England. The French Government received the assurance of armed support from England through the announcement which the English Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made on the morning of July 29 to the French Ambassador regarding the defiant statement which he intended to make to the German Ambassador.

5. Those responsible for England's policy were closely bound from the start by the entente with France, and made up their minds

during the critical week, if not before, to take part in the war if France should become involved.

6. Those responsible for England's policy were moreover very rightly of the opinion that a war on account of the Serbian question would not meet with public approval. For this reason they bent their efforts to find a pretext for war which would meet with English public approval. This was provided by the violation of Belgian neutrality, which had been jeopardized years before by Belgium, and which was not to be respected should emergency arise by the English General Staff, according to the statements of the English Military Attaché in Brussels.

8. That the violation of the neutrality of Belgium by Germany was merely a pretext for the English Cabinet, is shown by the fact that, before the sending of the English ultimatum to Germany regarding Belgium, the English Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had formally declared to the French Ambassador that England would consider passage through the Channel or the North Sea by the German fleet as a *casus belli*.

#### **Triple Entente Held Responsible.**

*On account of these indisputable interrelated facts, confirmed by the official utterances of the Governments of the Triple Entente, the contention that Germany desired and caused the war will be adjudged worthless before the Court of History. Russia is adjudged the incendiary, France and England the fellow-criminals.*

It does not lie within the scope of this recital to delve into the depths of the fateful concatenation of isolated happenings and negotiations between July 24 and Aug. 4 which caused the greatest and bloodiest of wars. Let it suffice to point out that these isolated happenings and negotiations—the words of a Grey, a Cambon, a Sazonof, the negotiations of the First Lord of the British Admiralty and the Russian Commander in Chief, which in themselves appear insignificant before the great tragedy of humanity—are merely manifestations rising to the surface at the decisive moment of the forces whose rule makes up the world history of our time. These are:

In Russia, the ambition to dominate in the Near East, doubly strong since the defeat suffered in the war against Japan, and determined, when there is prospect of success, to break down by force any resistance from the Central European Powers.


In France, the fateful direction of the entire national policy toward the negative goal of irreconcilable thirst for revenge, which, allied with fear, culminates in the continual readiness to attack us in conjunction with every strong foe of Germany.

In England, commercial envy against every rising régime, coupled with instinctive hostility toward the strongest Continental power and the tradition that every Continental ambition for sea power must be forcibly crushed.

These heterogeneous forces spun the net of the Entente, which became the frightful tool of the small minority ardently desiring war, and in which the great peaceful majority of the Russian, French, and English nations became hopelessly entangled. Russia's attitude toward Austria-Hungary in the Serbian question placed the burden of decision on the Entente. There can be no doubt that one word of refusal from France would have sufficed to hold back the Russian war party. It is at least very probable that a word of refusal from England would have held France back. It is absolutely certain that every word of encouragement from England must necessarily give the upper hand to the war parties in France and Russia. On the other hand, it is equally true that, had France and England stood aloof, no matter how such a step may have been formally authorized by treaties and agreements, the triple understanding would have been destroyed, and a new direction given to the policy of all Europe, which necessarily would have led, not to the hegemony of a single nation, but far more to a state of affairs in which every power could have had its due.

Confronted with the choice of preserving the entente or preserving the peace of the world, the statesmen at the helm in Great Britain and France, who had by their own acts and words in reality lost their freedom and become entangled, sacrificed the peace of the world to the Entente, under pressure from the cliques desiring war, and swept in their wake by far the greater part of the public in their countries by appealing to the sanctity of written and unwritten treaties.


To make clear the details of this complex web of guilt and fate will some day be the great task of the historians of our time.







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
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